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Abstract 
By using empirical research methods, we investigate concentration of managerial power effect on the relationship between 
internal control and corporate credit risk. As a result, it can be found that concentration of managerial power and internal 
control exist two curvilinear relationships, with the different degree of concentration of managerial power increasing, the 
supervisory role of internal control on credit risk is different. These results indicate that establishment of internal control 
and monitoring corporate credit risk lay an important theoretical and practical significance.  
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1. Introduction 
Credit risk is not only one of the fundamental causes of regional and  global financial crisis, but also the main  
root of the enterprise liquidity crunch. In 2008, after the global financial crisis, when pondering the causes of 
the credit risk, it was found that because of the lack of internal control, which leads to a rapid  increase of 
corporate default probability [1].Therefore, good internal control is a medicine to reduce the credit risk. Internal 
control effect on credit risk is influenced by power allocation of the top executives. Executives of moderate 
centralization are conducive to use of the powerfu l means to pool the company resources, thereby reducing the 
corporate credit risk. While executives’ centralization degree exceeds a certain range, executives are above the 
internal control, internal controls can only constraint ordinary employees, but not the top executives, increasing 
the risk of centralized self-serving [2]. So that power allocation of top executives makes internal control is the 
most crit ical and the weakest link, in which internal control p lays a role of risk management and control. 
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2. Literature review and theoretical hypothesis 
Owe to maternal weakness in internal control of China Aviation Oil (S)Corp  Ltd, the general manager have 
siphoned off company funds, causing the company huge losses. Especially since the 2008 global financial crisis, 
upon further reflection, it  is found that the quality of internal control goes h and in hand with credit  risk [3]. 
China government has been issued a series of the trad ing regulations and laws  to strengthen the construction of 
internal control. The relationship between internal control and corporate credit  risk, which may affected by the 
allocation of internal executive powers. Centralization will help the executives to conduct a comprehensive and 
effective control on organizational and operational activ ities , develop and consolidate the organization's 
business strategy, play integration advantages of organizat ional resources, avo id the underlying managers for 
their own sectoral interests and make decisions contrary to the overall interests of the organization [4]. In order 
to pursuit a common goal, the company need the executives have moderate centralizat ion. In particu lar, when 
the company makes critical decisions, and most of these managers lower were poorly educated , the company 
executives are more likely to heavily centralized [5].  
In the fight between centralization and decentralization of the organizat ion, the former seem to have the 
upper hand among most foreign scholars [6]. As for decentralization, only a few foreign scholars like Frangos 
& Bennett pointed out that, it  may reinforce the boundary between the teams, make it  difficult to coordinate 
and conformity each kind of strength and the resources, and reduce the speed and execution force of decision-
making [6]. The research is in question, like the foreign scholars had mixed react ions to the study; most of 
Chinese scholars also support enterprises to take the road of decentralization.  Especially when companies get 
bigger, usually  the distance between e xecutive and  the bottom of the corporate ladder goes greater, which  may 
affect the accuracy, completeness, timeliness of the company decision-making disseminate, eventually lead to 
the company resilience has dropped significantly[7]. In Chinese enterprise management practice, most 
companies actively  adopt centralized management mode, even the company has a significant scale [8]. Of 
course, there are definite social and historical reasons for this phenomenon. Since 1979, China had been 
progressively reforming its economic system, with the objective of establishing and improving the socialist 
market economy. But before that point, China's economy has a long time stay in a highly centralized p lanned 
economic system. Our country is in the transformation period from planned economic system to market 
economic system. Maintain a moderate centralization has historical tendency, but also contribute to, 
organizations to achieve decentralization mode s moothly. At present, internal control construction's spread in 
China; it was often a government-led init iative. If a strong team of executives is committed to promoting the 
construction of the internal control of the company, the higher the degree of centralization is conducive to the 
efficient allocation of various resources by the executives. Forcefully establish and improve the company's 
internal control system, make sure that the internal control system is used extensively and effectively  in  firm 
management [9]. Finally, it can effectively control the company's credit risk. 
When more centralized power to executives, middle and lower managers become a mere executor of h igh-
level decision, thus suppress their enthusiasm for work. In views of people bounded rational, on the one hand, 
the format ion of the wrong decision by top executives with personal bias and inaccuracy may cause heavy 
losses to the enterprise. On the other hand, executive may take advantage of power, handle business with an 
arbitrary fashion, and have other acts; what's more, the more power allocated with the executive, the greater the 
likelihood that these will occur within  the organizat ion. Th is is due to the greater executive powers, the s maller 
restricting extent by corporate boards of checks and balances, internal control activities or internal 
oversight[10], and eventually make the company's credit risk dramatically increases. Especially when the 
executive is hold concurrently by the president, director, or by other means influence the board of directors, so 
that in the case of the control of management executives can also put pressure on the board of directors [11], 
reduces the checks and balances on the executive by the board of directors [12], making the internal control 
containment greatly reduced role [13]. Consequently, when executive’s centralizat ion exceed a certain limit,  he 
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has all of the control. For example, the company's chairman also serves as the company's CEO, etc. When the 
centralization executives and shareholders have conflicts of interests, in order to seek to maximize their own 
interests as the goal, centralizat ion executives may make decisions contrary to the interests of shareholders, or 
use its position to override internal controls, pursue one's own self-interest through deception behavior, causes 
the internal control ineffective, ult imately  impossible to effectively curb the credit risks of the company. So, 
executive’s centralization exceed a certain limit in a company, this phenomenon may reduce the quality of 
internal control, heightening the credit risk of the company. Add it all up; this research is based on the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The degree of executives’ centralizat ion and internal control has conic shaped relationship. 
Hypothesis 1a: With the increase of the degree of centralization executives, improve the quality of internal 
control level, making internal control effect on credit risk significantly enhanced. 
Hypothesis 1b: Executives centralizat ion exceeds a certain range, which may make a decline in the level of 
internal control quality, eventually lead to internal control effect on credit risk weakening.  
3. Variables, data and model construction 
The dependent variable is the company's credit risk; it is now referred to by letters EDF. We will use EDF 
model which developed by KMV company to measure the credit risk. The independent variable is the 
company's internal control; it is now referred to by letters Index. It can be calculated by the quality of internal 
control evaluation index developed by Dibo Enterprise Risk Management, Shenzhen Technology Co., Ltd. The 
regulated variable  is the concentration of managerial power; it  is now referred to by letters Power. Learn Quan 
Xiaofeng(2010) approach, from the five sub-indices of power of management structure, CEO tenure, board size, 
the proportion of inside d irectors in the board of d irectors  and the level of Pyramid control chain, such as 
principal component level synthesis is calculated to obtain the power management integrated indicators, the 
larger the index, indicating the higher degree of executives centralization . 
The corporate credit  risk not only influenced by internal control, but also affected by many other factors , 
such as earnings, growth, leverage, scale, governance, industry attributes and annual effect. Therefore, the 
inclusion of these variables can be defined as control variables. The variables with the detailed definition and 
calculation are shown in Table 1. 
To test hypothesis H1a and H1b, set up the following model to test: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , ,
*i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
EDF Power Index Power Index ROA Totassgrrt
Lev Size Dudong Yeareffect Industryeffect
E E E E E E
E E E H
     
      ˄˅
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EDF SqPower Index SqPower Index ROA Lev
Totassgrrt Size Dudong Yeareffect Industryeffect
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Table 1: Variable definitions and calculations 
Variable name variable symbol computational method 
Corporate credit risk EDF use EDF model and MATLAB programming iterative calculation of the value of delinquencies EDF 
Internal controls Index Taking the natural logarithm of the quality of internal control evaluation index which developed by Dibo company 
Executives centralization 
Plurality 
When the CEO does not serve as a director position, the value is 1; While 
part-time directors, the value is 2; While part-time chairman of the company, the 
value is 3. 
Years CEO tenure 
Board size the number of Board of Directors 
Percent The proportion of the board of directors of internal 
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Length Actual control of listed companies in the longest chain of hierarchical control 
Power Principal component synthetic index above five dimensions of power indicators 
Corporate performance ROA rate of return on total assets 
Company growth potential Totassgrrt asset growth rate 
Financial Leverage Lev asset-liability ratio 
Company size Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Corporate  governance Dudong the proportion of the independent directors 
Annual and Industry effect Year/ Industry Control annual and industry effects, which take the value of either 0 or 1 
3.2 Sample selection and data sources 
Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2012, Data are from the GTA database 
(CSMAR), Rui Si database and annual reports of listed companies  are co llected by hand. When choosing 
sample, this paper carried out the following data processing:(1) Taking into account the company's sustainable 
management issues, taking the company in  2008 after listing;(2) Excluding ST and PT shares, because of the 
extreme value statistics will produce large errors ;(3) Eliminate financial, securities and insurance industries 
listed companies, because the listing Corporation performance measure and risk measure is different from 
the general listing Corporation;(4) Remove the data is not complete during the sample listed companies . Finally 
we got 6796 sample observations, applying of Stata10.0 software for statistical analyses. 
4 Empirical analyses 
Table 2 is the empirical analysis results of model 1 and 2. In the empirical analysis results of model 1, 
evidences show a significant negative correlat ion between the degree of executive’s  centralization and 
corporate credit risk, indicating that the increase of executive’s  centralizat ion, reducing the corporate credit risk. 
Simultaneously, internal control is negatively correlated with corporate credit risk, which proved that the 
correctness of the hypothesis 1.The cross -term of square degree of centralizat ion executives and internal control 
with credit risk have a significant negative correlat ion, it means that appropriate to increase the degree of 
centralization executives, helping to reduce the corporate credit risk. So, the hypothesis 1a is proved. In the 
empirical analysis model 2, square degree of centralization executives and credit risk have showed 
positive correlation of, which indicates that enhance the degree of centralizat ion executives above a certain 
level will increase the company's credit risk. Significant negative correlat ion of internal control and corporate 
credit risk has not been changed. The cross-term of square degree of centralizat ion e xecutives and internal 
control with credit risk no longer have a significant negative correlation, shows that 
executive centralizat ion degree is too high, weakened the role of internal control to credit risk, suggesting 
hypothesis 1b proved. 
Table 2: the concentration of managerial power, internal control and corporate credit risk 
 Model 1˄  ˅ Model 2˄  ˅
Regression coefficient T Value Regression coefficient T Value 
Constant term 0.4592*** 15.90 0.4538*** 15.70 
Power -0.0016*** -3.98   
SqPower   0.0001*** 3.52 
Iindex -0.0178*** -4.70 -0.0180*** -4.75 
Power_index -0.0049** -1.97   
SqPower_index   -0.0003 -1.27 
ROA -0.1183*** -13.62 -0.1183*** -13.62 
Totassgrrt 0.0146*** 7.49 0.0146*** 7.49 
Lev 0.0726*** 23.86 0.0724*** 23.80 
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Size -0.0024*** -4.21 -0.0024*** -4.18 
Dudong -0.0122** -1.96 -0.0113* -1.82 
Year/industry control control 
Adjust-R2 0.4045 0.4046 
Sample size 6796 6796 
Notes: * * *, * *, * denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
5. The research conclusion and the limitations  
From the perspective of credit risk, this paper excavates the regulating function of concentration of 
managerial power on the internal control of cred it risk.  Our research found, concentration of managerial power 
and internal control exist two  curvilinear relationships. As the concentration of managerial power increases, the 
internal control quality rises significantly, which increases the role of internal control on credit risk; however, 
when executives’ centralization degree exceeds a certain range, the internal control quality decreases 
considerably, weaken the role of internal control on the credit risk. 
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